3PS - Online Privacy through Group Identities by Mac Aonghusa, Pol & Leith, Douglas
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1
3PS - Online Privacy through Group Identities
Pól Mac Aonghusa and Douglas J. Leith
Abstract—Limiting online data collection to the minimum
required for specific purposes is mandated by modern privacy
legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) and the California Consumer Protection Act. This is
particularly true in online services where broad collection of
personal information represents an obvious concern for privacy.
We challenge the view that broad personal data collection is
required to provide personalised services. By first developing
formal models of privacy and utility, we show how users can
obtain personalised content, while retaining an ability to plausibly
deny their interests in topics they regard as sensitive using a
system of proxy, group identities we call 3PS. Through exten-
sive experiment on a prototype implementation, using openly
accessible data sources, we show that 3PS provides personalised
content to individual users over 98% of the time in our tests,
while protecting plausible deniability effectively in the face of
worst-case threats from a variety of attack types.
Index Terms—Personal Privacy, Plausible Deniability, Group
Identities, Recommender Systems, Web Search.
I. Introduction
Gathering and analysing data about user interests and be-
haviours is arguably the de facto business model for the free-
to-use internet. Personalisation to enhance user experience
is offered as a general motivation for broad data collection.
The numbers are impressive. Facebook earned an average of
US$4.65 per user from personalised content such as advertising
and promoted posts in the second quarter of 2017, according to
the Economist [1]. By comparison, an average of just US$0.08
per user came from direct fees such as payments within virtual
games.
In this paper we ask a natural question, is it true that much
less personal information than is currently collected is sufficient
to provide an effective personalised service? Recent legislation,
such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
mandates that personal data must be adequate, relevant and
limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for
which those data are processed, [2]. In this respect, broad
collection of user data without transparent purpose in online
interactions with everyday commercial systems is a particular
concern for individual privacy.
We consider users of everyday online commercial systems
where personalised content, tuned to user interests, is displayed
during interactions. The privacy model considered here is
based on plausible deniability of likely interest in topics an
individual user regards as sensitive. We show that, by adopting
the persona of an appropriate group containing many users, an
individual user can gain a good degree of personalisation while
successfully limiting personal data disclosure. The use of group
identities as a proxy technique provides a natural “hiding in
the crowd” form of privacy comparable to techniques such as
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k-anonymity, so that a user can plausibly deny their interests
in topics they deem sensitive. This model is intuitive for users
to understand and, importantly, to appreciate its limitations.
Our contributions include a novel proxy agent framework
we call 3PS for Privacy Preserving Proxy Service, where
a user may protect their interests in sensitive topics from
unwanted personalisation by submitting queries though a pool
of group identities called Proxy Agents. We also formalise
notions of personalisation utility and privacy detection and
test these experimentally using openly available data-sets.
We show that user privacy need not come at the cost of
reduced utility in personalised services when aggregated group
information represented by the proxy agent pool is sufficient
for personalisation.
The 3PS framework is designed to be simple to deploy with
minimal technical disruption to existing systems. We provide a
privacy preserving algorithm for selecting group membership
of proxy agents. By running the selection algorithm locally,
users can find the group identity best matching their interests
without revealing their interests. Through extensive experimen-
tal verification we show that our method of selecting group
membership is both accurate - selecting the group identifier
closest in topical interests with 98% average accuracy across
all experiments - and converges rapidly within 3 input–output
iterations on average.
Personal privacy is fundamentally a risk management ex-
ercise where there is an ongoing responsibility on users to
take reasonable care. There are no absolute guarantees and
individuals must strike their own balance between privacy and
utility. Our results suggest that using group identities such as
3PS can provide effective and verifiable privacy protection for
responsible users without overly degrading the personalisation
capability of the underlying backend system.
II. Privacy and Personalisation Models
A. General Setup
We consider a setup where users interact with a system S by
by submitting an input and receiving an output in response.
Each interaction between a user and S consists of an input–
output pair, referred to as an input–output interaction or step.
We assume that user inputs and system outputs are each
decomposable into features. For example, when modelling
a user querying movies or hotels the input features might
consist of keywords, or if assigning ratings the features might
be clicks. An ordered list of features with no duplicate entries
is called a dictionary. We let DX and DY denote the dictionary
containing valid input features to S , and valid output features
generated by S respectively. Individual features are indicated
thus, θXi , i = 1, . . . |DX | and θYj , j = 1, . . . |DY | so that θXi
denotes the ith feature in DX and θYj the j
th feature in DY .
We let X and Y denote the sets of possible valid inputs and
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outputs comprised of combinations of features from DX and
DY respectively, and the set of valid input–output interactions
is Z := X × Y .
We gather a sequence of consecutive input-output interactions
between a user and S into a session. Input–output interactions
may repeat during a session and so sessions are represented as
sequences of input–output interactions. We use set notation to
improve readability when working with sequences when the
meaning as applied to sequences is clear. We denote the overall
sequence of input–output interactions generated by users up to
step k by Zk := (z1, . . . zk) ∪ Z0, where zj denotes the jth
element of Zk and Z0 is the background knowledge available
before the first interaction z1 is observed. The subsequence of
input–output interactions associated with user u ∈ U up to
step k is denoted by Zu,k := (zu,1, . . . zu,k)∪Zu,0 where zu,j
denotes the jth element of Zu,k and Zu,0 is the background
knowledge available about u before zu,1 is observed.
Each user u has a private labelling function lu : Z −→ C
which associates input–output interactions in Z with topic
labels selected from a private, user-defined set of labels
C = {c0, c1, . . . cK}. We adopt the convention that the label c0
is identified with a catch-all “non-sensitive” category while the
remaining elements in C \ {c0} label individual “sensitive”
topics such as “health” or “finances”. The user labelling
function lu is private and labels every input–output pair in
Zu,k with at least one topic from C. Mostly we are simply
interested in whether an input-output pair is sensitive or not
for a user, in that case we define lu : Z −→ {0, 1} to be
the indicator function with lu(z) = 1 when input-output pair
lu(z) = c, c ∈ C \ {c0}, i.e. is labelled with a sensitive topic
by user u, and lu(z) = 0 otherwise.
Let Zu,cu,k := (z ∈ Zu,k : lu(z) = c) denote the subsequence
of observations originating from user u that are labelled with
topic c ∈ C. The sequence Zu,cu,k :=
⋃
c∈C\{c0}Z
u,c
u,k is the
subsequence of observations in Zu,k that user u has labelled
as sensitive. We let Zu,ck := (z ∈ Zk(k) : lu(z) = c) denote
the subsequence of Zk that u would label with topic c ∈ C.
The sequence Zu,ck :=
⋃
c∈C\{c0}Z
u,c
k is the subsequence of
Zk that would be labelled as sensitive by user u. The sequence
Zu,ck contains items from users other than u. Consequently,
while Zu,cu,t ⊆ Zu,ck , it is not generally the case that Zu,ck is a
subsequence of Zu,k.
We assume that user labelling functions are well-behaved in
the following sense:
Assumption 1 (Meaningful Labelling) An input-output pair
which is labelled as non-sensitive by a user is truly non-
sensitive for that user e.g. the user would be content for it to
be shared publicly.
Assumption 1 requires users to strike their own balance between
utility and privacy. The low risk strategy of simply labelling
every input-output pair as sensitive implies that the user may
not be able to use the system at all. For example, if the system
is a dating service, the knowledge that a person uses the
system necessarily reveals their interest in such a service. A
user choosing to use the system cannot include such system-
level topics in their sensitive set. The implicit statement in
Assumption 1 is that users form an individual judgement
regarding the inference capabilities of observers and to accept
a degree of risk associated with this judgement call proving
incorrect.
B. Privacy and Threat Model
Our interest is in privacy attacks where an attacker seeks
to infer topics of likely interest to users of online systems.
An attacker is successful when users are unable to deny their
interest in a topic on the balance of probabilities. Here attackers
have access to input–output interactions Zatt,k ⊆ Zk. By
analysing Zatt,k the attacker attempts to estimate topics that
are of likely interest to u. The privacy model here is plausible
deniability, allowing users to reasonably deny that observations
are solely associated with topics they deem sensitive. We
formalise plausible deniability in our context as follows:
Definition 1 (δ-Plausible Deniability) A user u can plausi-
bly deny their input–output observations are associated with
topics they deem sensitive if 1
P(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zatt,k) ≤ δ (1)
where the deniability parameter, δ, is chosen by u and Zatt,k
is the background knowledge of an attacker at step k of a
session.
This differs from the (,m)–Plausible Deniability model in-
troduced in [3] where an individual user claimed plausible
deniability because an input–output observation from that user
could be associated with any of several topics.
Observe that
P(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zatt,k)
(a)
≤ P(z ∈ Z
u,c
k ∩ Zk)
P(z ∈ Zk)
P(z ∈ Zk)
P(z ∈ Zatt,k) (2)
(b)
=
P(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zk)
P(z ∈ Zatt,k|z ∈ Zk) (3)
where inequality (a) follows from the facts that P(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈
Zatt,k) = P(z ∈ Zu,ck ∩Zatt,k)/P(z ∈ Zatt,k) and Zattu,k ⊆ Zk,
and equality (b) follows since Zatt,k ⊆ Zk. Hence, for δ-
plausible deniability to hold it is sufficient that
P(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zk) ≤ δP(z ∈ Zatt,k|z ∈ Zk) (4)
From (4), when an observer has access to all of the observations
in the system so that Zatt,k = Zk and P(z ∈ Zatt,k|z ∈ Zk) =
1 then it is sufficient to have P(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zk) ≤ δ for
δ-plausible deniability to hold. In the case that the observer
is able to make observations at a more local level, so that
P(z ∈ Zatt,k|z ∈ Zk) = pi < 1, then (4) implies that P(z ∈
Zu,ck |z ∈ Zk) ≤ δpi is required for δ-plausible deniability to
hold. Consequently, unless the user can plausibly deny that
they contributed to Zatt,k, we have
Observation II.1 (Power of Observers) Observers
represent more powerful threats when they have access
to more localised sequences of input–output interactions so
there is some trade-off involved in locality versus deniability.
1In this case P(z ∈ Zu,c
k
|z ∈ Zatt,k) denotes P(∃m : lu(Zatt,k(k)) =
1,m ∈ {1, 2, . . . }).
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C. Comparison with Other Privacy Models
In the group identity setup considered here, the intention is
to deny interest by hiding sensitive user activity in the overall
activity of users of shared group identifiers. The setup here can
be compared with other privacy models. We show briefly how
this is done in the cases of two common models of privacy,
Differential Privacy, [4], and Individual Re-identification, [5].
1) Re-identification
Re-identification risk occurs when an attacker, possessing
observations Zatt,k, can assert that sensitive input–output
interactions generated by user u are identified with probability
greater than 1−  for 0 <  1. In other words, when
P(z ∈ Zu,ck ∩ Zu,k|z ∈ Zatt,k) > 1−  (5)
for 0 <  1.
If δ-plausible deniability holds (1) guarantees
P(z ∈ Zu,ck ∩ Zu,k|z ∈ Zatt,k) ≤ δ (6)
since Zu,ck ∩ Zu,k ⊆ Zu,ck . Consequently (1) prevents re-
identification of those sensitive input–output interactions with
probability at least 1− δ.
2) Differential Privacy
Recall that a query mechanism M : D −→ R satisfies (, γ)-
differential privacy [4] if, for any two sequences D1,D2 ∈ D
of length n differing in one element, and any set of output
values S ⊆ R, we have
P(M(D1) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(D2) ∈ S) + γ (7)
One important class of mechanisms are those where sequences
in D are first perturbed, e.g. by adding noise, and then queries
are answered. It is this approach which is effectively adopted
here, with the perturbations being introduced by the randomness
of the process generating the input–output interactions. An
attacker observes a sequence of input–output interactions and
seeks to associate a label with one or more input–output
interactions, namely whether or not they were likely to be
generated by a target user u and are sensitive for that user.
Consider therefore the queryMz(Zk) = lu(z) i.e. which labels
input-output pair z as 1 when it is sensitive for user u and
labels it 0 otherwise. This is a worst case query in the sense
that it assumes the attacker knows the labelling function lu, and
when this is not the case the labelling accuracy will obviously
be degraded. Let D1,D2 ∈ D be two input-output sequences
such that D1(k) = D2(k), k = {1, . . . , n} \ {j} where D1(k)
denotes the k’th element of sequence D1 and similarly for
D2(k) i.e. sequences D1 and D2 are identical except for the
j’th element. Mechanism Mz is (, γ)-differentially private
provided
p1 ≤ ep2 + γ, p2 ≤ ep1 + γ (8)
1− p1 ≤ e(1− p2) + γ, 1− p2 ≤ e(1− p1) + γ (9)
where
p1 := P(lu(D1(j)) = 1), p2 := P(lu(D2(j)) = 1) (10)
are the probabilities that input-output pair j in sequence D1,
respectively D2, is labelled sensitive by user u. For sequences
satisfying the δ-plausible deniability condition (1) we have
p1 ≤ δ and p2 ≤ δ. It can be verified that the (, γ)-differential
privacy conditions (8)-(9) are therefore satisfied for  ≥ 0 and
γ ≥ max{δ, 1− e(1− δ)}.
D. Other Linking Attacks
The privacy model described here is concerned with attacks at
the application layer that seek to link input–output interactions
and associated topics to individual user interests. Linking
attacks targeting other vectors are also possible.
One vector for attack is for the service provider to attempt to
place cookies or third-party tracking content on the web pages
viewed by a user. Within the EU, the GDPR rules require
that users be explicitly informed of such actions and must
take a positive step to opt in. Hence attempts at such tracking
seem like a relatively minor concern. Outside the EU, existing
tools for blocking third-party trackers can be used, leaving the
setting of unique identifying first party cookies as the main
concern. This can be mitigated by standard approaches e.g. by
activists maintaining lists of cookies that can be safely used
(similar to existing lists of malware sites, trackers and so on)
and users blocking the rest.
Another possible vector of attack is to record the IP address
of the user browser, and thereby try to link the ratings back
to the individual user. However, due to the widespread use
of techniques such as VPN or NAT, use of IP addresses as
identifiers is unreliable. Users also have the option of using
tools such as TOR to further conceal the link between the IP
address revealed to the server and the users identity. Such tools
are the subject of an extensive literature in their own right and
are complementary to the present discussion.
The parties here are sometimes referred to as observers,
rather than attackers, since the relationships here are not
fundamentally adversarial being rather of the honest but curious
variety. Since our main interest is in honest but curious attackers
we exclude active attacks against the UI and user devices from
consideration, which are, of course, the subject of an extensive
literature in its own right.
III. The 3PS Architecture
The challenge is to construct an online system which satisfies
Definition 1, thereby providing δ-plausible deniability to users,
while also providing an effective personalised service. We
propose an architecture, which we refer to as 3PS, whereby
users access the system through a pool of group identities
referred to as proxy agents. This is illustrated schematically
in Figure 1. The 3PS architecture therefore consists of three
interacting parties denoted {U ,P,S } as follows:
• An online system S . S is a black-box in the sense that
only inputs to, and outputs from, S are observable while
details of the internal workings of S are hidden from
users.
• A pool P of Proxy Agents acting as Group Identities,
routing queries to, and output responses from S . In effect
each group identity is an account used to access the system,
with this account being shared by multiple users.
• A pool U of users who can submit input to, and receive
corresponding output responses from, S via the group
identities provided by the proxy agents in P .
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Fig. 1. Users with proxy agent pool setup
In the 3PS architecture the proxy agent pool is controlled
by the backend service. One key reason for doing this is to
ensure that proxy agent IDs are recognised as genuine users by
the backend system. If not recognised as bona fide users the
proxy agents may be flagged as a bot or robot and so trigger
defences, such as “captchas”, or even be blocked. Other than
acknowledging the proxy agents as legitimate users, the 3PS
system is intended to be backwards compatible and does not
require significant engineering changes in the backend system.
A. Providing Personalisation
The backend system S is assumed to generate recommenda-
tions for a proxy agent based on profiling interests in topics
as it would for any other user. In a shared proxy setup users
inherit the shared profile of the proxy agent they choose. A
user accessing S via the pool of proxy agents and wishing
to obtain good recommendations should therefore choose the
proxy agent whose interests most closely match their interests.
As an example, Figure 3a and Figure 3b show the results of
issuing the query “cheap flights” through two different proxy
agent setups. The choice of query is deliberately intended
to trigger commercial advertising for illustrative purposes. In
Figure 3a the proxy agent is dedicated to Google Search users
located in a single country, Ireland. In Figure 3b the proxy agent
is a web-proxy gateway shared by Google Search users from
many countries. The response via the proxy agent in Figure 3a
contains significantly more content than the proxy agent in
Figure 3b. Content in Figure 3a is also more localised to the
region of the user, as illustrated by the Google flight search box
outlined in red on the figure and in the Ireland “.ie” domains
on other results. Content obtained from the shared proxy agent
in Figure 3b by contrast reflects the regional settings of the
proxy agent rather than the user – in this case, UK currency
and websites appear in the adverts.
To obtain personalised content, each user chooses a proxy
agent closest to their interests in the sense that it is a solution
to
min
p∈P
∑
c∈C
|P(z ∈ Zu,c
u,k
|z ∈ Zu,k)− P(z ∈ Z
u,c
u,k
|z ∈ Zp,k)|
s.t. P(z ∈ Zu,c
k
|z ∈ Zp,k) ≤ δ (11)
where Zp,k denotes the input–output interactions of all users
with proxy p. The constraint in (11) ensures that δ-plausible
deniability holds for an observer with access to Zp,k.
B. Threat Models
By varying the observations, Zatt,k, available to an observer it
is possible to model classes of attack encompassing the system
itself and observers with access to more localised background
Fig. 2. Examples of Google Search adverts for individual and shared user
profiles.
(a) Google Search Adverts for an individual user
(b) Google Search Adverts for a shared proxy user
knowledge. We introduce two observer classes we will use in
the remainder of this paper.
1) Privacy Against A Global Observer
A global observer denotes an attacker where Zatt,k = Zk.
That is, with access to all of the input–output interactions for
the entire system up to the present step k. A global observer
does not have knowledge of the user labelling function lu but
can try to cluster the observed input–output interactions to infer
topics of likely interest. This class of attacker encompasses the
system itself, external parties such as advertising partners and
attackers obtaining data by hacking of the system. Provided (1)
holds for Zatt,k = Zk then a user has δ-plausible deniability
against global observers.
2) Privacy Against A Proxy Observer
We also consider a proxy observer, namely a global observer
who also has knowledge of the set of proxy agents Pu ⊂P
used by user u. Hence, a proxy observer knows that the input–
output interactions Zu,k generated by user u are contained in
the subsequence
Zatt,k = (z ∈ Zk : ιp(z) = 1, p ∈Pu) (12)
where indicator function ιp equals 1 for input–output in-
teractions submitted via proxy p and 0 otherwise. From
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Observation II.1, a proxy observer is a more powerful attacker
than a global observer by having access to more localised data.
Provided (1) holds with Zatt,k given by (12) then a user has
δ-plausible deniability against proxy observers.
C. Mitigating Sybil Attacks
Attacks by dishonest users who submit false inputs in an attempt
to manipulate the outputs of the system are outside the scope
of the present paper. Although this is an important challenge
for all online systems it is not specific to 3PS. That said,
the use of shared proxies and unlink-ability of input–output
interactions to individual users does potentially facilitate Sybil
attacks and so we briefly describe one mechanism, based on the
work of [6], where such attacks can be disrupted while being
compatible with the 3PS setup. In summary, each user mints
a number of session tokens (with associated serial number),
blinds them with a secret blinding factor and forwards them
to the 3PS system through a non-secure channel. The number
of tokens available to a user is limited e.g. by requiring users
to authenticate or make payment to the service in order to
forward a token, or perhaps by limiting the number of tokens
allowed within a certain time window. Note that during this
phase the user might be identified to the system, e.g. to make a
payment. The system then signs the tokens with its private key,
without knowledge of the serial number associated with the
tokens. On receiving the signed tokens back from the system,
the user can remove the blinding factor and use the tokens
to submit inputs to the system anonymously. Double use of
tokens is prevented by the system maintaining a database of
the serial numbers of all tokens that have been issued.
IV. Prototype Implementation
In this section we describe an experimental implementation of
a backend recommender system accepting text queries as inputs
and producing text-based outputs. It is not intended to be a fully
working system but rather a proof of concept implemented as
software that is sufficient to demonstrate the feasibility of 3PS
and to illustrate how personalisation and privacy verification
might be implemented. In the prototype implementation the
internal state of simulated users, proxy agents and the backend
system can be inspected for measurement during test. This
allows us to conveniently compare probability estimators during
experiments that would be private in a production system.
A. Personalisation
In the prototype implementation inputs and outputs are se-
quences of words and the dictionaries, DX := {θX1 , θX2 , . . . }
and DY := {θY1 , θY2 , . . . }, consisting of common keywords
appearing in the input and output respectively. We adopt a
standard bag–of–words language model [7] where features in
an input–output pair are modelled as being drawn independently,
with replacement, and ignoring order, according to the mixture
model
P(z ∈ Ak |z ∈ Bk)
=
|DX |∑
i=1
|DY |∑
j=1
P(z ∈ Ak |{θXi , θYj } ∈ z)P({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Bk)
(13)
where Ak,Bk ⊆ Zk are non-empty sequences of observations,
[8]. The quantity P(z ∈ Ak|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z) is the probability
that an input-output pair z belongs to subsequence Ak given
the keywords {θXi , θYj } co-occur in z. Similarly P({θXi , θYj } ∈
z|z ∈ Bk) is the probability that keywords {θXi , θYj } co-occur
in z given that z belongs to subsequence Bk.
Expression (13) can be applied directly to (11) so that
P(z ∈ Zu,c
u,k
|z ∈ Zu,k)− P(z ∈ Z
u,c
u,k
|z ∈ Zp,k)
=
|DX |∑
i=1
|DY |∑
j=1
P(z ∈ Zu,c
u,k
|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
×
P({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zu,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
− P({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zp,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)

(14)
and the minimisation element of (11) becomes a calculation
over the term labelled (c) in (14). We will return to the
constraint element of (11) later.
Term (14)(a) is the only element of the RHS of (14) that
depends on knowledge of the user labelling function lu. Since
(14)(a) and (14)(b) do not depend on Zp,k they can be estimated
privately by u. To allow (14) to be privately by a user, it is
sufficient for each proxy agent p ∈P to release the probability
distribution (14)(c) publicly. With this a user can construct
(14).
Expression (14) consists of matrix multiplications of matrices
of size |DX |×|DY |. The proxy selection condition in (11) can
be solved efficiently in practice by estimating the various
probabilities.
B. Estimating Probabilities
To estimate probabilities in our prototype implementation,
user u applies their private labelling function lu to label
each input–output pair {x, y} ∈ Zu,k for topics in C. Let
Ucu,k and Vcu,k denote the labelled inputs and outputs of Zu,cu,k
respectively. Apply count-vectorisation to each element of Ucu,k
and Vcu,k and gather the result into count-matrices Ac and
Bc of size |Ucu,k|×|DX | and |Vcu,k|×|DY | respectively. Since
|Ucu,k|= |Vcu,k|, the quantity Nc = ATc Bc is of dimension
|DX |×|DY |. Nc is the count co-occurrence matrix of input–
output interactions of input–output features in Zu,k labelled for
topic c. The ij–element of matrix Nc, denoted Nc,ij , is the co-
occurence count of the features {θXi , θYj } in Zu,k labelled for
topic c ∈ C. We apply regular Laplace Smoothing, [9], to avoid
divide by zero underflows in subsequent computations when
there are sparse occurrences of keywords in Zu,k. Laplace
smoothing resolves this problem by adding a factor λu > 0 to
each keyword count so that Nc,ij −→ Nc,ij +λu. The quantity
P̂({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zu,cu,k) =
Nc,ij
Nc
Nc =
|DX |∑
i=1
|DY |∑
j=1
Nc,ij (15)
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is then an estimator for P({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zu,cu,k). Similarly,
an estimator for P({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zu,k) is given by
P̂({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zu,k) =
Nij
N
(16)
N =
∑
c∈C
Nc, Nij =
∑
c∈C
Nc,ij
and
P̂(z ∈ Zu,cu,k|z ∈ Zu,k) =
Nc
N
(17)
is an estimator for the probability of an observation being
labelled for topic c.
Let O have components Oij(z) given by
Oij(z) =
{
1 if φXi (x) > 0 and φ
Y
j (y) > 0 for z = {x, y}
0 otherwise
and define
Oc,ij :=
∑
z∈Zu,cu,k
Oij(z), Oc :=
|DX |∑
i=1
|DY |∑
j=1
Oc,ij
and, O :=
∑
c∈C
Oc
so that an estimator for P(z ∈ Zu,cu,k|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z) is
P̂(z ∈ Zu,cu,k|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z) =
Oc,ij
Oc
(18)
and an estimator for P(z ∈ Zu,k|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z)
P̂(z ∈ Zu,k|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z) =
∑
c∈C Oc,ij
O
(19)
For a proxy agent p, let Up,k and Vp,k denote the inputs
and outputs in Zp,k respectively. Apply count-vectorisation
to each element of Up,k and Vp,k and gather the result into
count-matrices C and D respectively of size |Up,k|×|DX |
and |Vp,k|×|DY | respectively. The quantity M = CTD,
of dimension |DX |×|DY |, is the count co-occurrence ma-
trix of input–output interactions of input–output features in
Zp,k, to which Laplace smoothing is applied. We estimate
P({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zp,k) for each proxy agent p as
P̂({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zp,k) =
Mij
M
, M =
|DX |∑
i=1
|DY |∑
j=1
Mij
(20)
and Mij denotes the ij–element of matrix M.
Expressions (16), (18) and (20) can then be combined, to
estimate the RHS of (14) for each user u.
In our experimental setup, it is convenient to estimate
plausible deniability directly from the definition (1) as
∆u,catt,k := P̂(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zatt,k) =
|z ∈ Zatt,k : lu(z) = c|
|z ∈ Zatt,k|
(21)
The probability of user u observing an input–output pair
labelled with topic c when accessing S through proxy agent p
is P(z ∈ Zu,cp,k |z ∈ Zp,k). This is estimated in our experimental
setup as
P̂(z ∈ Zu,cp,k |z ∈ Zp,k) =
|z ∈ Zp,k : lu(z) = c|
|z ∈ Zp,k| (22)
and P(z ∈ Zu,cu,k|z ∈ Zu,k), the probability of user u observing
an input–output pair labelled with topic c when accessing S
directly is estimated as
P̂(z ∈ Zu,cu,k|z ∈ Zu,k) =
|z ∈ Zu,k : lu(z) = c|
|z ∈ Zu,k| (23)
We measure the estimated utility loss incurred by user u as
a result of selecting proxy agent p, using (22) and (23), as
∆U
u,c
p,k
:=
1
2
∑
c∈C
|P̂(z ∈ Zu,c
u,k
|z ∈ Zu,k)− P̂(z ∈ Z
u,c
p,k
|z ∈ Zp,k)|
(24)
that is, the total variation between the sensitive topic probability
estimator the user would calculate if they used S directly and
the probability estimator of the topic calculated by the proxy
agent they used.
C. User Estimate of Privacy Threat
The challenge for a user in checking (1) is that it requires
knowledge of Zu,ck by user u. So that u is required to know
the history of input–output interactions for each sensitive topic
c for all users in the 3PS system.
In the prototype implementation we use the approach that
each user u has defined a set, Θu,cu,k ⊆ DX × DY , for each
sensitive topic c, consisting of input–output keywords whose
presence means an input–output observation is labelled as
sensitive by u. In experiments, Θu,cu,k, is selected for each user
u and topic c using the training data to choose the keyword
pairs for which
Θu,cu,k(α) =
{
{θXi , θYj } : {P̂(z ∈ Zu,cu,k|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z) > α
}
(25)
where 0 < α ≤ 1 is a parameter chosen using cross-validation.
For each topic c define the associated indicator function over
observations z ∈ Zk and {θXi , θYj } ∈ Θu,cu,k(α), as
ιcα({θXi , θYj }|z) =
{
1 if {θXi , θYj } ∈ z
0 otherwise
(26)
That is, the indicator function labels an observation as sensitive
if it contains an input–output keyword pair from Θu,cu,k(α)
and non-sensitive otherwise. Using the bag-of-words model
to combine this with the published estimator P̂({θXi , θYj } ∈
z|z ∈ Zp,k) provided by each proxy agent we get an estimator
for P(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zp,k) given by
P̂α(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zp,k) =∑|DX |
i=1
∑|DY |
j=1 ι
c
α({θXi , θYj }|z)P̂({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zp,k)∑
c∈C
∑|DX |
i=1
∑|DY |
j=1 ι
c
α({θXi , θYj }|z)P̂({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zp,k)
(27)
In a real-world setup it is up to the user to decide how
to select Θu,cu,k. For example, the PRI tool developed in [10]
and [3] allows a user to analyse input–output observations for
privacy threats and so assess which keyword pairs are more
or less revealing of sensitive topics. In this way tools such as
PRI can provide information to assist in constructing Θu,cu,k in
a real-world setup.
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V. Experimental Setup
A. General Setup
In our experimental setup, the test datasets, described later, are
labelled with a set of topics C. Before an experimental run
each user and proxy agent simulated during the experiment
is allocated a topic of interest from C. When a user or proxy
agent is allocated the non-sensitive, catch-all topic c0 we will
say the user or proxy agent is randomly initialised meaning
that they have no interest in a specific sensitive topic. We call
the percentage of proxy agents in P or users in U that have
been randomly initialised the diversity of P or U . During
experiments we will typically report results for 0%, 50% and
100% diversity in P and/or U .
At the start of each experimental run, each user and each
proxy agent is allocated initial data consisting of input–output
pairs from the test dataset labelled for their allocated topic of
likely interest, referred to as background knowledge. Each user
and proxy agent in the simulation has a copy of the common
dictionaries DX and DY from S . Next, each user and each
proxy agent estimates initial values of the probabilities in
Section IV-B from the initial background knowledge using
DX and DY . We refer to these probabilities as the internal
state of the user or proxy agent. An input query is a keyword
in DX drawn from Θu,cu,k(α = 0.5) at random by u.
Users select a proxy agent best matching their allocated
topic of interest by solving (11). When a proxy agent receives
an input query from a user it passes it directly to S . Since
the set of topics is known to S in our experiments, S creates
a personalised response by solving c∗ = arg max c∈C P̂(z ∈
ZS ,cp,k |{θXi } ∈ z), to find the topic of maximum likely interest
from C given the input it received, and then selecting an
output labelled for c∗. The resulting output is returned to the
proxy agent. The input–output interaction pair is added to the
background knowledge of the proxy agent and its internal state
is updated with new probability estimates. The output is routed
to the requesting user and the same input–output interaction is
added to its background knowledge and its internal state and
probability estimator are updated.
Background knowledge is not shared among users and
proxy agents. When a user switches to a different proxy agent
during an experimental run, the user history of input–output
interactions does not transfer to the new proxy agent so that
individual proxy agents see only the history of interactions
from users accessing S through it. A full reset is performed
between test runs by re-initialising the entire setup.
B. Data Sources
Data from three real-world sources are used in experiments.
Hotels Tripadvisor hotel reviews containing hotel review titles,
review bodies and lowest price per room downloaded from,
[11], and consisting of over 1.6 million hotel reviews. Queries
consisting of words extracted from review titles are used as
inputs and detailed review bodies represent outputs.
Products Product review titles, review bodies and overall
rating scores downloaded from, [11], containing Amazon
product reviews for 6 types of merchandise and consisting of
over 2.2 million product reviews. Words appearing in product
review titles are used as query inputs and outputs review bodies.
Search Web search queries and corresponding result pages
relevant to 5 sensitive topics {“weight loss”, “anorexia”,
“diabetes”, “bad credit history”, “pregnancy”} used in [10]
‘and [3] and comprising 86, 837 Google searches constructed
by gathering search terms from the Wikipedia article related
to each sensitive topic and from the top web search queries
appearing on www.Soovle.com for the non-sensitive queries.
Here the queries submitted to Google are the inputs with the
corresponding result pages taken as outputs.
C. Assigning Topics
Default topics for experiments were defined as follows from
each of the test datasets.
Hotels Five topic categories are defined by dividing the
lowest price per room into equally spaced ranged, namely
0 := [0, 110], 1 := (110, 220], 2 := (220, 330], 3 :=
(330, 440], 4 := (440, 550], 5 := (550,∞). Reviews are then
labeled according to the lowest price.
Products The overall rating score is used to define topic
categories, namely very dissatisfied (Topic 1) to very satisfied
(Topic 4). Topic 0 is used to indicate no rating was given so
there are 5 topic categories in total.
Search There are 6 topic categories labelled {0 := “Other”,
1 :=“weight loss”, 2 :=“anorexia”, 3 :=“diabetes”, 4 :=“bad
credit history”, 5 :=“pregnancy”} as in [10], [3] Each input–
output pair is labelled with the topic the input query refers
to.
When experiments are performed requiring a larger number
of topics than those above, the Hotels dataset is divided into
the required number of topic categories by specifying different
lowest price ranges. In this way it is possible to create a variety
of topic categories automatically by re-grouping the data into
finer price categories to create more topic categories. The
Hotel dataset was chosen for convenience since the categories
are defined by numeric, price-per-room, ranges and so it is
straightforward to programatically define more categories by
changing the numeric ranges.
D. Revealing Keyword Pairs
Each of the test datasets was preprocessed using the text
processing described in Section IV-B to produce dictionaries
DX and DY for each dataset. A range of dictionary sizes
from 50 to 1000 features was assessed by selecting random
subsequences Ak ⊆ Zk and choosing the dictionaries that
minimise
|P̂(z ∈ Ak |z ∈ Zk)
−
|DX |∑
i=1
|DY |∑
j=1
P̂(z ∈ Au,c
k
|{θXi , θYj } ∈ z)P̂({θXi , θYj } ∈ z|z ∈ Zk)|
(28)
From this we selected |DX |= 250 and |DY |= 500 for our
experiments.
The distribution of keyword pairs in samples drawn from
each of the three test datasets is shown in Figure 3 by topic.
Average values were calculated by taking 10 samples each
of 10, 000 items from each of the test datasets. Error bars
in Figure 3 indicates variance from sampling. In the case of
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all datasets and for all topics, the co-occurrence frequency
of the majority of keyword pairs fall below 0.3. The rarest
keyword pairs by topic, and hence the most revealing, have co-
occurrence frequencies greater than 0.5. These keyword pairs
comprise less than 10% of the total keyword pairs, suggesting
that the most revealing keyword pairs form a small subset in
the case of all datasets.
Fig. 3. Frequency of co-occurence of keyword pairs by topic averaged over
samples from all datasets, sample variation is shown as error per topic
VI. Experimental Evaluation
A. Topic Diversity and User Numbers
We assess the effects of topic diversity and user numbers for the
case consisting of a single proxy agent and a single sensitive
topic. We denote the senstive topic c1 so that C := {c0, c1}
where c0 is the catch-all topic. A single proxy agent setup
means Zk := Zp,k so that results here apply to both proxy and
global observers. Tests were repeated with 0%, 50% and 100%
Fig. 4. Effect of topic diversity among users on plausible deniability and
utility loss for a single proxy agent with initial fixed topic interest by user
diversity and number of users (A step is an input–output pair event)
of users having cu = c0 and the remainder having cu = c1.
We report results for 10, 50 and 100 users for compactness.
Results are averaged by dataset and error about the mean is
shown as a shaded region. Plausible deniability, from (21),
and utility loss, from (24), averaged over users, are shown in
Figure 4. Plausible deniability is plotted in the first row and
utility loss in the second row.
From (1), a user has better plausible deniability for lower
values of δ since δ is an upper bound. Our results suggest that
increasing user numbers decreases δ and so improves plausible
deniability but only when users have varied interests. Once
users have a diverse range of interests, increasing the number
of users is observed to accelerate improvement in plausible
deniability. For utility loss, increasing volumes of users without
specific interests is observed to increase utility loss. When all
users of a proxy agent have no specific topic interests so that
diversity is high this is reflected in increased utility loss relative
to topic c1 as one might expect.
B. Personalisation Performance
In 3PS users select proxies closest to their interests but
the responses generated by proxy agents also change as
users submit queries via them. We would like this joint
selection/update process to converge so as to achieve good
personalisation performance. In this section we use our pro-
totype implementation to evaluate this process. Experimental
setups with proxy pools of sizes 3 ≤ |P|≤ 30 and numbers
of users 10 ≤ |U |≤ 120 were configured for each of the test
datasets. We initialise proxy agents in P randomly so that
there is no automatic choice of best proxy agent–user match.
Users are allocated a sensitive topic as their target topic from
the set of topics in each of the test datasets. Each user applies
(11) to select a proxy agent best matching their target topic by
enumerating each proxy agent in P in turn. Users only submit
queries related to the their allocated topic of interest so that
noise due to diverse topic interests of users is controlled in the
setup here to focus on convergence properties. Once a proxy
agent is selected a user issues a query related to their topic of
interest and the internal states of users and proxy agents are
updated accordingly. Results are reported as averages over |P|
and |U | and topic for compactness and shown in Figure 5.
The measured accuracy of (11) for proxy agent selection is
shown in the LHS plot of Figure 5. Proxy agent selection is
deemed to be accurate when a user chooses a proxy agent whose
allocated topic of most likely interest matches the allocated
target topic of the user. The RHS of Figure 5 is the utility
loss, calculated from (24), taken at each input–output step. For
visual clarity, standard error is shown for the average utility
loss over all datasets. Utility loss is high and accuracy is low
initially reflecting the fact that the initial internal state of proxy
agents is randomly set. Convergence to the proxy agent with
closest interests is observed to happen quickly for all data
sources, achieving at least 93% accuracy for all datasets after
3 iterations with a corresponding average utility loss of 20%.
When averaged over all data sources the average accuracy is
98% after 3 input–output steps. The utility loss is also observed
to decrease for all topics over time, reaching an average across
all datasets of 0.18 after 3 input–output iterations and 0.0002
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Fig. 5. User to Proxy Agent Selection Accuracy (LHS) and Utility Loss
(RHS) averaged over all experimental datasets
by iteration 20.
Users are observed to select the correct proxy agent with
greater than 90% accuracy, and to reject all proxy agents with
100% accuracy if there is no suitable proxy agent available.
Overall, in experiments where the ratio of users to proxy agents
was increased from 1 : 1 to 30 : 1, the utility loss is observed to
decrease more slowly as the average number of users attaching
to each proxy agent increases. When the ratio of users to proxy
agents was 30 : 1, for example, the average utility loss on
step 1 was 0.67. Convergence to a low utility loss was also
observed to be rapid, even at high user to proxy agent ratios,
reaching 0.18± 0.02 after 4 input–output steps when the user
to proxy agent load factor was 30 : 1.
The number of topic categories was also varied by regrouping
the Hotel dataset. High proxy agent selection accuracy was
consistently observed, with accuracy of greater than 90% after
step 3. The utility loss was also observed to decrease rapidly
to less than 0.20 ± 0.02 after 4 input–output steps, reaching
minimum of less than 0.01 by iteration 20 on average over all
topics.
Overall, the results suggest that the proxy agent selection
method converges rapidly and accurately, providing a high
degree of personalisation. Utility loss also decreases rapidly as
more topic specific input–output events are observed. This is
consistent across the test datasets, and for a range of user–to–
proxy agent ratios, suggesting that the proxy agent selection
mechanism performs well across a variety of setups.
C. Plausible Deniability
We next assess the degree of plausible deniability protection
available to users with respect to a proxy observer when there
are multiple proxy agents. We also assess how diversity in
user topic interests influences plausible deniability and utility
loss. Since a proxy observer is at least as powerful as a global
observer the results here provide worst-case bounds in the face
of a global observer. Experimental setups with proxy pools
of sizes 3 ≤ |P|≤ 30 and numbers of users 10 ≤ |U |≤ 120
were configured for each of the test datasets. Each proxy agent
p ∈P was allocated a topic cp ∈ C as their topic of interest.
Each user u ∈ U was allocated with a target topic of interest
cu ∈ C with setups of 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of users
having cu = c0 to model various levels of diversity of topic
interests among users. Results are reported as averages over
|P| and |U | and topic for compactness and shown in Figure 6
and Figure 7.
In Figure 6 we show measurements of estimated level of
plausible deniability. We show estimates of ∆u,cp,k calculated
directly from (21), together with the values of the estimator
(27) calculated using Θc(α) as the set of sensitive keywords. To
model the situation where the user has partial or censored dic-
tionaries DX and DY in experiments, we show measurements
for values for α ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
Fig. 6. Plausible deniability by topic averaged over all datasets, topics, sizes
of proxy agent pool and number of users. Expression (A) indicates use of
(21), and Expression (B) use of (27) with value of α shown.
The results shown in Figure 6 indicate that plausible
deniability is observed to improve monotonically as diversity of
user interest in topics increases. This is true when either (21) or
(27) are used as estimators, for all values of α. The estimated
value using (27) is consistently lower than the corresponding
estimation from (21) for all values of α tested. Figure 7
Fig. 7. Utility Loss averaged over all datasets, topics, sizes of proxy agent
pool and number of users. Expression (A) indicates use of (21), and Expression
(B) use of (27) with value of α shown.
illustrates the trade-off between improved privacy and utility
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loss. Increasing utility loss is observed in all cases as the
fraction of users with diverse topic interests increases as the
“signal-to-noise” ratio of coherent interests to random interests
decreases. This is observed when either (21) or (27), for all
values of α, are used as estimators. Using (27) is observed
to under-estimate utility loss over all datasets tested. In this
case (27) should be taken as a best-case guarantee of utility
loss and that the actual utility loss will be higher. We note that
the ultimate assessment of utility loss is up to the user - if
they do not like the personalised content they receive then they
can switch to another proxy agent, or stop using the system
entirely.
D. Defending Privacy
We consider a proactive privacy defence strategy of injecting
random queries. Between “true” queries a user issues “noise”
queries to every member of the proxy agent pool other than
their selected best matching proxy agent about topics other than
their allocated topic of interest. This defence is motivated by
the observation earlier that increased diversity of topic interests
among users is reported to increase plausible deniability. By
controlling the level of noise injection we hope to limit the
associated utility loss. In practice this kind of injection of
obfuscating, uninteresting, “noise” queries can be performed
in the background by users.
Fig. 8. Plausible deniability for different diversity levels in the proxy agent
pool for various topic-to-noise ratios. Results are average by topic and over
all datasets.
Experimental setups with proxy pools of sizes 3 ≤ |P|≤ 30
and numbers of users 10 ≤ |U |≤ 120 were configured for each
of the test datasets. Each proxy agent p ∈P was allocated a
topic cp ∈ C as their topic of interest. Each user u ∈ U was
allocated with a target topic of interest cu ∈ C with setups
of 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of users having cu = c0
to model various levels of diversity of topic interests among
users. After a sensitive, true input for topic cu was issued to
a chosen proxy agent, a noise query was constructed where
input keywords were drawn at random for topics other than
the sensitive user topic cu, and issued to all proxy agents in
the pool, except the last chosen proxy agent. To assess the
effect of issuing different amounts of noise queries mixed with
true queries, “Topic–to–Noise” ratios of 50%, 100% and 200%
were also used. So that, for example, in the case of a true-
to-noise ratio of 200%, 2 noise queries are issued for every
1 true queries on average by a user. Results are reported as
averages over |P| and |U | and topic for compactness and
shown for measurements of plausible deniability in Figure 8,
and for utility loss in Figure 9. The first plot in each case
shows the case when there is 0% diversity of topic interest in
the proxy agent pool as a baseline.
With the random noise injection strategy plausible deniability
against a proxy observer improves steadily during an experi-
mental run for all levels of topic diversity in our experiments.
For all levels of topic diversity, adding more noise results
in faster improvement in plausible deniability as expected
intuitively. As the topic diversity in the proxy agent pool
increases, less random noise is required to produce the same
changes in plausible deniability as do larger random noise
levels. Intuitively this is to be expected since topic diversity is
an indication of the variation in topic interests among users.
Standard error in the mean, shown as shaded regions is small,
indicating that improved plausible deniability is observed with
high confidence for all datasets. Utility loss, shown in Figure 9,
Fig. 9. Utility loss for different diversity levels in the proxy agent pool for
various topic-to-noise ratios. Results are average by topic and over all datasets.
increases initially and achieves stable levels after 5− 10 input–
output steps with the cases where topic diversity is highest
reaching a stable level quickest. Standard error is small in
the case of all datasets, suggesting the average values plotted
reflect expected behaviour with high confidence.
The plausible deniability and utility loss results for 0% topic
diversity are a worst-case. Even in this case the utility loss
at levels of random noise up to 100% the utility loss is 20%
after 20 steps - compared with an improvement in plausible
deniability from 100% to 60% on average. As topic diversity
increases the improvements in plausible deniability are larger
than the associated utility losses in all cases. Taken overall, our
results suggest that the benefits to privacy of adopting a strategy
of random noise injection outweigh the associated utility losses,
with the greatest benefits occurring when the privacy risk
from low topic diversity is highest. Run as a background task,
injecting random noise by all users in a controlled manner
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provides a mechanism for enforcing effective topic diversity in
the proxy agent pool with corresponding benefits for privacy.
E. Discussion
The results of the random proxy injection defence in our
experiments suggest that once a user is alert to diversity,
the 3PS setup can provide balance of probability plausible
deniability of topic interests. The method of choosing revealing
keyword pairs outlined in Section IV-C provides a practical
bound on plausible deniability and is straightforward to apply
in practice. In a production setting a browser plug-in could
automatically suggest new keywords for inclusion by the user
in local keyword dictionary extensions.
To apply (1) in practice, a user also needs a way of
confirming that proxy agents are being truthful about the
probability estimators it publishes. The notion of probe queries
was introduced in [10] to allow a user to test the behaviour
of black-box systems without revealing sensitive interests.
By checking input–output interactions users can label the
observation as sensitive or not and adjust their view of revealing
keywords. The techniques introduced in [10] can be used to to
check for observations that vary from that expected from (27)
indicating possible concerns with the estimators distributed by
that proxy agent.
Choosing Θu,cu,k to estimate plausible deniability requires care.
From (27) it follows that
P̂α(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zatt,k) < P̂β(z ∈ Zu,ck |z ∈ Zatt,k)
when 0 < α < β ≤ 1. Choosing α = 1 to include as many
keywords as possible in Θu,cu,k is the safest threat detection
strategy in our setup here. We have assumed here that there
is no incentive for dishonesty neither is there any malicious
poisoning nor accidental corruption in our setup. In a real-
life, production setup when DX or DY are partially complete,
poisoned or deliberately censored, a user may choose any
input–output keywords for Θu,cu,k. We note that the techniques
introduced in [10], [3] provide tools to test when input–output
keywords indicate privacy concerns that could be adapted to
assist a user with constructing Θu,cu,k.
While our experiments suggest that 3PS can provide ac-
ceptable levels of plausible deniability with low utility loss,
our results also emphasise the importance of maintaining
adequate vigilance to prevent interests in sensitive topics from
leaking and taking care to avoid overly revealing content that
might compromise plausible deniability when user interests
are known.
VII. Related Work
The potential for privacy concerns in recommender systems are
well known in the literature. For example, Shilling attacks are
discussed in [12]; Sybil attacks to determine user preferences
in [13]; Shilling attacks to sabotage recommendations in [14],
using auxiliary information to de-anonymise Netflix data [15]
and references therein.
Privacy preserving techniques in recommendation systems
have largely focused on how to incorporate privacy into the
recommendation process. In [16], random perturbation of
data is used to develop privacy-preserving frameworks for
collaborative filtering methods. In [17], profile obfuscation
together with a randomised dissemination protocol are em-
ployed. Another approach is to distribute the recommendation
process by including a trusted intermediate agent between user
and backend system, such as [18]. In [19], differential privacy
is incorporated into the algorithms used in the Netflix prize
competition to produce privacy preserving recommendations.
Grouping users behind intermediate layers is a well studied
privacy technique. Protecting the sensitivity of user data, and
particularly of user profiles exposed to the online system,
by grouping users behind a proxy layer is defined as Level
2 Privacy in the classification scheme of online privacy
approaches in [20]. In [21] a third-party, privacy-proxy hosts
a group profile where the privacy-proxy performs aggregation
over multiple user activities to produce the group profile.
In [22] profile generalisation is achieved locally on a user’s
machine via a user-side privacy-proxy layer where the group
profile is learned from a globally accessible taxonomy of
topics. Obfuscating user data through profile generalisation
is studied extensively in the literature. Approaches typically
obfuscate or mask user interactions with search engines with the
aim of disrupting online profiling and personalisation. PEAS,
[23], [24], combines local obfuscation with a privacy-proxy
to provide unlink-ability between user and query. Shuffling
user profiles as a counter to unwanted profiling in [25]. The
approach introduces a trusted third party server to shuffle
individual profiles among a pool of users without regard for
protecting utility. A common consideration for generalisation
approaches in these works is how to provide minimally
sufficient common structure to effectively generalise user
interests without incurring unacceptable loss of utility. This
is commonly solved by distributing generalised usage data,
allowing users to create statistical patterns of usage. For
example, in [22], a global dictionary is used that includes
statistics on frequency of occurrence of concepts in it. In [21],
an intermediate privacy-proxy server distributes similar usage
statistics allowing users to construct statistical models of usage.
There are examples of website proxies offering privacy
preserving services to access mainstream search engines on the
Internet. Two of the better known are DuckDuckGo hosted in
the US on Amazon Web Services, [26], and StartPage hosted
privately in the Netherlands, [27]. Functionally both are similar,
encrypting traffic via https, and employing POST and re-direct
techniques to obfuscate requests. Both claim to relieve so-called
filter-bubbles, [28], by aggregating results from several source
systems. In both DuckDuckGo and StartPage the proxy user
profile adopted by users of both systems is global. Personalised
content such as advertising that is displayed on search result
pages is correspondingly generic.
Protecting users from individual re-identification often com-
bines encryption, hashing and noise addition on the local user
machine. Common challenges in designing privacy protection
at individual user level is that they can be computationally
prohibitive and require substantial user management for locally
maintained dictionaries of queries, features or URLS accessed
by the user. In [29] user interests with added noise are locally
encoded via a Bloom filter instead of in a traditional cookie.
Obfuscation through noise is used in [30] where fake URLs
drawn from a user-specified dictionary are injected into the user
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history to confuse an adversary. GooPIR, [31], [32], attempts
to disguise a user’s “true” queries by adding masking features
directly into a true query before submitting to a recommender
system. Results are filtered to extract items that are relevant to
the user’s original true query. Query obfuscation and masking
is addressed in [33] user queries are hidden within a stream
of at least k ‘cover queries’ to provide a form of k-anonymity.
PWS, [34], and TrackMeNot, [35], [36], inject distinct noise
queries into the stream of true user queries during a user query
session, seeking to achieve acceptable privacy while not overly
compromising overall utility.
There is evidence that users are concerned about their privacy
on the Web but do not always reflect this concern in their
online behaviours, [37]. In [38], in-the-wild measurements
of user interactions with Ad blocking technologies suggest
that users overwhelmingly accept default settings and do not
install updates such as whitelists. The conclusion reached is
that technologies for user privacy must be effective, but also
unobtrusive and simple to maintain. By comparison with users,
online systems have proven alert and adaptable in responding
to attempts to protect privacy at individual user level. Stateful
(cookie) and stateless (fingerprinting) tracking is widespread on
the web. In [39], [40], [41], [42] separate studies of 1 million
websites reveal widespread data exchange among third parties,
stateful tracking from third-party cookie spawning and stateless
fingerprint-based tracking. In [40] users are observed to be
tracked by multiple entities in tandem on the web.
Search engine algorithm evolution is a continuous “arms-
race”, as evidenced in the case of Google, for example, by major
algorithm changes such as Caffeine and Search+ Your World
included additional sources of background knowledge from
Social Media, improved filtering of content such as Panda to
counter spam and content manipulation. More recently semantic
search capability has been added through Knowledge Graph and
HummingBird, [43], [44], [45]. The importance of personalising
content in the online arms-race is further underlined by the
continuing arms-race between Ad-blockers and web-site owners.
Anti-Ad-blockers are discussed in [46], [47] in a study of
100,000 popular websites finding evidence that web-site owners
are making visible changes to content in when Ad-blockers are
detected. In a small number of cases pop-ups are presented that
cannot be dismissed until the Adblocking software is disabled.
VIII. Discussion and Conclusions
A. Discussion
Accessing online systems via shared proxies in 3PS appears
to provide a natural form of “hiding on the crowd” privacy
once there is sufficient diversity of users and input–output
interactions. Hence, when the 3PS architecture is used, the
main requirement to obtain privacy is to ensure sufficient
diversity. Quantities here are expressed in terms of probabilities,
with randomness in the process of observing input–output
interactions arising from randomness in how the user chooses
inputs and any randomness in the system response. This
means that practical estimation of these probabilities requires a
model of user inputs and system outputs, perhaps derived from
observed behaviour but in any case introducing a degree of
risk that the model is inadequate and the calculated probability
values inaccurate.
Our experiments indicate that the need to maintain a level of
engagement and alertness with respect to individual online
privacy is an unavoidable feature of online existence. A
framework such as 3PS provides tools to help an engaged
user to detect unwanted effects such as affinity in the proxy
agent pool but the decision to engage and to take action is
an unavoidably personal responsibility. As already discussed,
personal judgements regarding risk seem intrinsic to discussions
of privacy.
B. Conclusions
Through 3PS we provide a user with the capability to achieve
anonymity by adopting group identities. We provide a method
to decide on the optimal choice of group identity from a pool
of proxy identities. The method we develop is both efficient
and scalable, and does not require a user to reveal information
about their interest in sensitive topics.
We define a threat model based on notions of increasingly
powerful observers with access to various levels of information
about the 3PS system. Using the associated attack models we
show that 3PS offers users a high degree of protection for their
interests in sensitive topics.
Mass personal data collection is a persistent feature of online
systems that has been justified as required for personalisation.
Through the framework of the 3PS system our results suggest
that much less personal data collection is required for adequate
personalisation. This has significant implications for online
providers in light of legislation such as GDPR that requires
data to be limited to that which is proportionate to the purpose
of collection.
Our experiments show that once diversity of likely interests
is maintained across the proxy pool, 3PS provides high levels of
protection for users while providing satisfactory personalisation.
The 3PS framework provides readily implementable techniques
to decide whether a particular choice of proxy agent is overly
revealing of likely interest in a topic of their choice so that lack
of diversity in the proxy pool is detectable by users without
requiring additional infrastructure such as trusted intermediate
parties. The defence of injecting noise queries is observed
to improve plausible deniability while maintaining levels of
utility. Automation of noise injection as well as techniques such
as automated suggestion of new keywords through browser
plug-in capabilities mean that 3PS can be implemented with
relatively little intrusiveness on the user side by automating
through, for example, a browser plug-in.
The fast-convergence and high accuracy of the proxy agent
selection method, observed in our experiments indicate that
3PS can provide a safe and scalable solution that requires little
retro-fitting to work with existing systems.
Overall, our results indicate 3PS is a promising first step
and more research is required in large-scale production envi-
ronments. Directions for future research include, undertaking
a practical program of applied research to scale 3PS to a
production implementation, investigating how non-text inputs
and outputs such as image can be accommodated in 3PS and
incorporating 3PS into a larger framework of practical privacy
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tools to provide robust end-to-end protection for users.
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